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A MODEL OF CRIMINAL PROCESS:
GAME THEORY AND LAW
Robert L. Birminghamjt
Early ordnance was prized for both destructive and aesthetic prop-
erties. During the sixteenth century, Italian craftsmen, although aware
of the attendant sacrifice of ballistic efficiency, complemented the en-
graving with which they adorned the field pieces they manufactured by
decorating the shot itself.' Much discussion of criminal law is analogous
to the Italian cannonball; analytic embellishment adds richness in
detail but often conceals crucial structural interrelationships. In this
article I attempt to use the techniques of game theory to isolate minimal
attributes of problems familiar in criminal law. In the first section I
construct a model indicating the impact of the criminal law on the
actions of prospective malefactors and, by extension, on the welfare of
society as a whole; in subsequent sections I explore the implications
of this model for public policy. My hope is to achieve clarity through
abstractness.2
t Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University. A.B. 1960, J.D. 1963, Ph.D. 1967,
University of Pittsburgh; LL.M. 1965, Harvard University.
I C. CrPoLLA, GuNs AND SAILS IN TE EARLY PHASE OF EURoPEAN ExPANsioN 1400-1700,
at 43 (1965).
2 Introductory discussion of any field perhaps unfamiliar to the reader is hampered
by the propensity of those working in it to develop a specialized vocabulary that prevents
accurate definition of any single term without appeal to other terms that are equally
unknown; successful explication thus necessarily tempers obscurity with imprecision.
Shubik, whose stature as a scholar sanctions expository oversimplification, has provided
probably the best preliminary description of the work on which I rely:
Game theory is a method for the study of decision making in situations of
conflict. It deals with human processes in which the individual decision-unit is
not in complete control of other decision units entering into the environment.
It is addressed to problems involving conflict, cooperation, or both, at many levels.
The decision-unit may be an individual, a group, a formal or an informal
organization, or a society....
The essence of a "game" in this context is that it involves decision makers
with different goals or objectives whose fates are intertwined. The individuals are
in a situation in which there may be many possible outcomes with different values
to them. Although they may have some control which will influence the outcome,
they do not have complete control ....
... The individual must consider how to achieve as much as is possible,
taking into account that there are others whose goals differ from his own and
whose actions have an effect on all.. . . He must adjust his plans not only to
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Abstraction can, of course, be pursued to the point of disutility.3
Although I feel my efforts stop well short of this point, I have based my
analysis on several simplifying assumptions that necessarily limit
the applicability of my conclusions. Utility is considered cardinally
measurable, so that numbers expressing values may legitimately indi-
cate not only their rank but also the magnitude of the differences among
them. Attention is restricted to a community composed of a sanction-
ing authority, termed the state, and a large number of individuals with
identical tastes and beliefs, whose levels of happiness may be summed
to obtain total community welfare. A single choice confronts each indi-
vidual: he can do or refrain from doing a defined act condemned as
criminal by the state. State response is similarly dichotomous: the sanc-
tioning authority may impose or fail to impose a single precise penalty
on the individual. Gains and losses caused by commission or noncom-
mission of the proscribed act and punishment or nonpunishment by
the state are treated as independent. While the behavior of the indi-
vidual is a function of the disparity in -attractiveness of his alternative
opportunities, irrationality and limited powers of discrimination are
assumed to render his conduct probabilistic rather than deterministic.
I
COMPONENTS OF PLEASURE
Pairs of alternative actions may be represented symbolically:
a,= noncommission of the offense by the individual
b, = commission of the offense by the individual
his own desires and abilities but also to the desires and abilities of others.
The outcome of the game will depend on the strategies employed by every
player.., and possibly on events beyond the control of any player ....
Shubik, Game Theory and the Study of Social Behavior: An Introductory Exposition, in
GAME THEORY AND RELATED APPROACHES TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 3, 8-9, 13 (M. Shubik ed. 1964).
See generally R. LucE & H. RAWF'A, GAmEs AND DEcIsIoNs: INTRODUCrION AND CRITICAL
SuRvEY (1957); G. OWEN, GAIME THEORY (1968).
Discussions pertinent to my analysis include Becker, Crime and Punishment: An
Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the
Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1065 (1968); Schelling, Game Theory and the Study
of Ethical Systems, 12 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 34 (1968).
3 Homans, for example, attributes this assertion to Claude Levi-Strauss: "'I had
looked for a society reduced to its simplest expression. That of the Nambikwara was so
far reduced that I found only men there." G. HOMANs, THE NATURE OF SocAL ScsacE,
at xi (1967). Russell's translation unimaginatively replaces the penultimate word of the
quotation with "human beings." C. LtvI-Smruss, TRIsrEs TROPIQUES 310 (J. Russell transl.
1961).
[Vol. 56:57
CRIMINAL PROCESS
a2  nonpunishment of the individual by the state
b2 = punishment of the individual by the state
Successive decision by the individual and the state offers four possible
outcomes, each yielding the individual a stated level of utility. Let u
stand for the utility to him of licit behavior unaccompanied by punish-
ment. If, in addition, his gain in utility from committing the offense
without regard to the probability of punishment and his loss in utility
from punishment without regard to his conduct are indicated by v
and w respectively, one may write:
aia2 = noncommission & nonpunishment -- u
bia2 = commission & nonpunishment -- U + V
a1b2 = noncommission & punishment -> u - W
b1b2 = commission 8c punishment -- U + V - w
These outcomes and the values associated with them can be expressed
most conveniently in what is termed normal form. Here the individual
selects a row and the state a column; their choices jointly determine
an outcome:
a2  b2
a, U U-W
bl u+v u-~v-w
The decision of tie state to punish or not to punish any individual
will normally be in part a function of whether he has committed the
proscribed act; that it is not completely so is often attributable to the
inability to distinguish adequately culpability from innocence. Since
it is certain that the state will either punish or not punish, the prob-
abilities of these actions must sum to unity but may differ dependirig
upon the prior choice of the individual. Setting y equal to the likeli-
hood of punishment given obedience to the law by the individual and
z equal to the increase in this likelihood resulting from his criminal
behavior, one obtains:
1 - y = probability of a2 given a,
1 - y - z = probability of a2 given bi
y = probability of b2 given a,
y + z = probability of b2 given bi
Combination of the probabilities of punishment and nonpunish-
ment with the utilities of various outcomes allows computation of the
expected value to the individual of doing or not doing the proscribed
act. The expected value of a game that pays one dollar if a flipped
1970]
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coin lands heads up and nothing if it lands tails up is fifty cents: one
multiplies the gain from each outcome by its likelihood and adds the
products. E., and Ebl, the expected values of choices a, and bl, may
be similarly derived:
(1) EI - u(1 - y) + (u - w)y
(2) Eb= (u + v) (l - Y-Z)+ (u + v- w) (y + z)
Let:
1 - x = probability of selection of a,
x = probability of selection of b,
The assumed identity of individual tastes and beliefs permits inter-
pretation of x as a personal propensity or as the proportion of the
population of the community behaving unlawfully. Multiplication of
the expected values of equations (1) and (2) by their probabilities of
realization and summation yields:
(3) E = (1 - x)E + xEb = u + vx - wy - wxz
Again because of the identity of tastes and beliefs, E is not only the
expected value of the complete game to each individual but also an
index of community welfare. Assuming benevolent government, the
goal of one player, the state, reduces to maximization of the worth of
the game to the other player, the individual.
II
MORALITY AND LAW
The distinction between social control through moral suasion and
through rules of criminal law assumes its most Manichaean form in
Chinese legal thought. Confucian philosophy admonishes the ruler to
govern by exemplary personal moral excellence; the legalist tradition
urges that offensive conduct must be discouraged by threat of punish-
ment.4 The posited dichotomy, present but less striking in Western
theory, is premised on parallels between alternative policies evident in
the model.
Let the sanctioning authority be perfectly efficient, so that all those
and only those who have committed the proscribed act are punished.
Then:
4 D. BODDE & C. MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CINA: EXEMPLIIIED BY 190 CH'ING DYNASTY
CASEs 3-51 (1967).
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y=O
z=l
Since the probabilities of outcomes alb2 and b1a2 fall to zero, the game
of section I reduces to choice by the individual between outcomes a1a2
and bb 2 with values to him of u and u + v - w respectively. By pre-
vious assumption one may write x, the probability that an individual
will behave illegally, as a function of v - w, the disparity between the
values of these outcomes. Hence criminality may be reduced by lower-
ing v or raising w; changes in these two variables which are equal in
magnitude but opposite in sign will have identical preventive impact.
Herodotus, perhaps the least reliable of ethnographers, reported:
Another tribe further to the east is known as the Padaei, and the
people live on raw meat. As to the general way of life of these folk,
it is said that when a man falls sick, his closest companions kill him,
because, as they put it, their meat would be spoilt if he were
allowed to waste away with disease. The invalid, in these circum-
stances, protests that there is nothing the matter with him-but to
no purpose. His friends refuse to accept his protestations, and kill
and eat him just the same. Should the sufferer be a woman, it makes
no odds: her women friends deal with her precisely as the men do.
If anyone is lucky enough to live to an advanced age, he is offered
in sacrifice and devoured-this, however, rarely happens, because
most of them will have had some disease or other before they get
old, and will consequently have been killed by their friends.5
Our distaste for such practices appears almost independent of fear of
criminal punishment. Socialization seems largely a consequence of early
training sensitizing the individual to feelings of shame or guilt; pri-
marily through contacts within the family, he learns to associate trans-
gression of community norms with discomfort resulting either from the
disapprobation of others or from self-blame. The model indicates a
gain from guiding conduct by instilling pride in proper behavior rather
than by promoting remorse concerning personal inadequacies: v, in-
versely related to the success of the socialization process, should where
possible be diminished by increasing u while holding u + v constant.
The state can exercise partial control over v through its educational
policies; mere designation of an act as an offense, moreover, may alter
its value to the indoctrinated.6
While protest against official failure to maintain a belief that
5 HERODOTUS, THE HISromRs 217 (A. de S61incourt transl. Penguin ed. 1954).
6 Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing, and Habituative
Effects, 1969 Wis. . REv. 550.
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"every Crime is a sinne" 7 must remain essentially unfocused, specific
criticism of levels of punishment normally accompanies public alarm
concerning the extent of illegal behavior. Inability to enforce Prohibi-
tion in the United States inspired radical proposals:
One woman suggested that liquor law violators should be hung by
the tongue beneath an airplane and carried over the United States.
Another suggested that the government should distribute poison
liquor through the bootleggers; she admitted that several hundred
thousand Americans would die, but she thought that this cost
was worth the proper enforcement of the dry law. Others wanted
to deport all aliens, exclude wets from all churches, force boot-
leggers to go to church every Sunday, forbid drinkers to marry,
torture or whip or brand or sterilize or tattoo drinkers, place
offenders in bottle-shaped cages in public squares, make them
swallow two ounces of castor oil, and even execute the consumers
of alcohol and their posterity to the fourth generation.8
As the model demonstrates, the threat of punishment can deter the
potential wrongdoer; moreover, the likelihood of such deterrence in-
creases with the severity of the associated penalty. Punishment never-
theless need not be maximized. Although x falls as w increases, the level
of w is itself a component of community welfare.
The currently topical distinction between application of additional
repressive force and efforts to remedy causes of discontent is reflected in
the possibility of achieving a desired disparity between u and u + v - w
while holding either u or u + v - w constant. Two centuries ago Adam
Smith noted that "[n]obody will be so mad as to expose himself upon
the highway, when he can make better bread in an honest and indus-
trious manner."9 He thus recognized that if gain from licit behavior is
substantial, proscribed actions alternative to such behavior may prove
counterproductive even without regard to the prospect of punishment;
in terms of the variables of the model, a higher u may be associated with
a lower v. In Britain during the Industrial Revolution pauperism was
consciously discouraged by reducing the amenities of the workhouse
below those attainable through private employment. Since the stan-
dard of living of the free laborer was already abysmally low, imprison-
ment at times represented the most attractive opportunity of the un-
skilled; an incarcerated offender might receive twice as much food
as those confined under the poor laws, while the labor required of him
7 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 151 (1651).
8 A. SINCLAIR, PROMBrrION: THE ERA Or ExcEss 26 (1962) (footnote omitted).
9 A. SmTrH, LEcrURS ON JUSrICE, POLICE, RmENUE AND ARMS 156 (E. Cannan ed. 1896).
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was occasionally only half as great.10 Here the customary excess of u
over u - w was more than dissipated by the rigors of the competitive
system.
While the prospect of imprisonment today seldom motivates illicit
conduct, poverty remains an important factor:
In a recent year, the crime rate in Washington for the month of
August jumped 18 percent over the preceding month. A veteran
police officer explained the increase to David L. Bazelon, Chief
Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. "It's
quite simple .... You see, August was a very wet month ...
These people wait on the street corner each morning around 6:00
or 6:30 for a truck to pick them up and take them to a construction
site. If it's raining, that truck doesn't come, and the men are
going to be idle that day. If the bad weather keeps up for three
days ... we know we are going to have trouble on our hands-
and sure enough, there invariably follows a rash of purse-snatch-
ings, housebreakings and the like.... These people have to eat like
the rest of us, you know.""
Increasing penalties when prosperity without redistribution increases
temptation towards crime produces questionable results; more adequate
provision for the disadvantaged would make the criminal alternative
less enticing.
III
PROBABIITIES OF PUNISHMENT
The assumption of the previous section that the state can unerr-
ingly discriminate between innocent and guilty individuals is obviously
unrealistic. Packer has contrasted a Crime Control Model, character-
ized by the overriding importance of repression of deviant behavior,
with a Due Process Model, where emphasis is placed on avoiding error
and precluding arbitrary official action. Given a budgetary constraint,
the former approach would seek to maximize the number of guilty
punished, while the latter would stress minimization of the number
of innocent wrongly convicted. His dichotomy focuses attention on
the cost in terms of incorrect convictions that society is willing to in-
cur to achieve the punishment of various percentages of offenders.' 2
10 P. COLLINS, DICKENS AND CRIME 74 (1968); J. TOBIAS, CRImE AND INDusRIAL SocIEYr
iN TnE 19TH CENTURY 207-08 (1967).
11 E. LIrow, TALLY'S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREErCORNER MEN 43 n.8 (1967).
12 H. PAcKER, THE LImTs OF TmE C'rmiNAL SANCTiON 149-73 (1968).
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Assuming attention is restricted to instances where y is small
relative to z, the relationship that Packer stresses may be expressed
within the framework of the model by writing y as a function of z. The
state can increase the disincentive impact of a given punishment by
increasing z; if resources available for law enforcement do not vary,
however, consequent gains will normally be at least partially offset by
concomitant increases in y. Minimization of y and maximization of z
are therefore inconsistent objectives. Over the relevant range not only
y but also the rate of change of y should increase as z increases, since
high levels of z normally imply punishment of the less clearly culpable.
If error is a possibility in every adjudication, y and z can equal zero only
simultaneously. A value of z less than zero is most realistically inter-
preted as the result of misspecification of criminal conduct rather than
as evidence of official perversity. An increase in z, like a decrease in v or
an increase in w, will raise u by discouraging criminal behavior; the
gain in welfare resulting from lessened criminality must nevertheless
be balanced against the utility losses of those punished.
That these conclusions concerning the dependence of y on z do not
hold for all mathematically possible values of the variables is evident
from the fact that z cannot exceed zero when y is set equal to unity. The
Bugandan solution to urban unrest probably approached this combi-
nation of maximal punishment and minimal discrimination as closely
as any historical response:
Although the population of the capital must have run to tens
of thousands, there is no sign that a city mob took any part in
rebellions, as it may have done in some West African states. This
is doubtless because very stern measures were taken to control the
population of the capital. Periodically, and especially at times of
political dissension, or when there were large numbers of rowdy
men abroad in the streets, the royal executioners were sent out to
ambush the streets of the capital and to seize and kill all persons
who could not give a good explanation of their presence. Those
arrested had not necessarily committed any crime: they are de-
scribed as people who had no employment in the capital, and in-
cluded innocent peasants who were bringing in food.... It is there-
fore not surprising that the common people went in fear of their
lives in the streets of the capital, and if they had to go there has-
tened home again as soon as their business was completed.'3
Such pathological extremes may properly be disregarded in analysis.
Evidence of less extravagant British tastes is supplied by Hale,
Blackstone and Paley, and Fortescue, who remonstrate unwillingness to
13 M. GLUCKMAN, POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRBAL Sociry 153 (1965).
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sacrifice one innocent man to secure conviction of five, ten, and twenty
offenders respectively. Bentham speaks of a ratio of one hundred to one.
Paley nevertheless argues: "[C]ourts of justice should not be deterred
. . . by every suspicion of danger, or by the mere possibility of con-
founding the innocent with the guilty.-They ought rather to reflect,
that he who falls by a mistaken sentence, may be considered as falling for
his country .. . ."14 His utilitarian pronouncement provides small
comfort to those selected for patriotic sacrifice.' 5
Those uncertainties which prevent reduction of y to zero similarly
preclude reliable estimation of its value. The value of z, less difficult to
compute, is surprisingly low for many categories of crime: in the United
States in 1965 only twenty-two percent of reported serious offenses
against property were resolved;16 even the regular user of marijuana
risks but one chance in twenty of arrest in a given year.'7 In any case,
alteration of either y or z need not entail change in the other so long
as total expenditures for law enforcement are not fixed.
IV
DETERRENCE
If the probability of criminal behavior were constant, changes in
u, v, and w would affect welfare by altering the value of one or more
of the possible outcomes; changes in y and z would affect welfare by
altering the probabilities of these outcomes. Changes in the variables
v, w, and z, however, also affect x, the probability of criminal behavior.
14 W. PALEY, Moral and Political Philosophy, in WORKS 27, 142 (1831) (emphasis in
original). See 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRA-
TION FROM 1750: THE MOVEMENT FOR REFORM 1750-1833, at 367-68 (1948); Fletcher, Two
Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal
Cases, 77 YALE LJ. 880, 881-82 (1968).
15 The competition in humanitarian superlatives has not escaped satirical treatment.
Galbraith, reviewing reform following revolution in an imaginary Latin American state,
records:
The Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of Flores ... took up the most
advanced position. "The fundamental spirit of democracy," he told a meeting
of the Faculty of Law a few days after the revolution, "proclaims that it is better
that a hundred desperate criminals escape than that one innocent man be lodged
in jail." He announced that he was inviting Professor Daniel Escobedo to spend
a year in Puerto Santos making a study of the criminal code and mentioned
their common Spanish antecedents. Somewhere he had got the impression that
Escobedo was Dean of the Harvard Law School.
J. GALBRAITH, THE TRIUmPH: A NOVEL OF MODERN DILOMACY 126 (1968).
16 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, REPORT:
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIErY 97 (1967).
17 Mandel, Problems with Official Drug Statistics, 21 STAN. L. REv. 991, 1032 (1969).
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I have previously assumed x a function of the disparity in attractiveness
of the opportunities confronting the individual. This disparity, most
conveniently expressed as the difference between the expected gains
from illicit and licit conduct, may be obtained by subtraction of equa-
tion (1) from equation (2):
(4) Eb 1 - E 1 = v - wz
Clearly x will approach zero when v - wz is a large negative number
and unity when v - wz is a large positive number; furthermore, x
should equal .5 when v - wz is zero. The desired relationship may be
written:
(5) x = (1 k-Z) -l
where the parameter k must exceed unity. Although x may be elimi-
nated from equation (3) by substitution from equation (5), the com-
plexity of the substituted term and its derivative makes this adjustment
unrewarding.
The partial dependence of x on the product wz indicates that
changes in the severity of sanctions and in the likelihood of their appli-
cation to offenders have equivalent deterrent effects. The comple-
mentarity of these instruments of state action was noted by Bentham:
Be the offence, be the punishment, what it may,-in proportion
as you exclude this or that quibble, this or that device of technical
procedure, by which a certain proportion of the whole number of
delinquents are saved, and the probability of punishment in case
of delinquency thereby diminished, you would put it in your
power to make a correspondent and proportionable reduction in the
magnitude of your punishment.
What is the same thing in other words,--it is because your law
is so full of quibbles, exclusionary rules, and other points of
practice, by which impunity is given, and seen to be given, to
known delinquents, that (the probability of punishment being sub-
jected to constant diminution) delinquency receives proportion-
able increase: and, for combating it, the only other resource
remaining, and the only resource that a quibble-loving lawyer
will endure to hear of, is an increase of the magnitude of the
punishment.18
Penologists have argued that "[c]ertainty of detection is far more
important than severity of punishment."1 9 Their assertions of imbal-
18 7 J. BENTHAm, WoRKs 453 (J. Bowring ed. 1843).
19 Shawcross, Crime Does Pay Because We Do Not Back Up the Police, N.Y. Times,
June 13, 1965, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. See C. BEccARIA, ON CIMazs AND PUNISHMEMS 58 (H.
Paolucd transL 1968); W. PALEY, supra note 14, at 141.
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ance are in part the product of humanitarian assaults on severe sanc-
tions associated with minor offenses in England until the middle of the
nineteenth century. Recent sociological research affirming the deterrent
effect of the criminal process but largely discounting the value of ex-
tended incarceration may be incorporated into the model by positing
a nonlinear relationship between the prospective disutility of punish-
ment to the individual and the period of his confinement: as this period
increases the marginal impact of imprisonment may approach zero.20
Although a change in x affects E by altering the frequencies of
actions with normally differentiated expected values, its more crucial
impact occurs indirectly through consequent variation in u. The indi-
vidual acts to maximize his own utility. While socialization may induce
incorporation of the welfare of others as an important element in his
preference function, some divergence between his interests and those
of the community appears inevitable. Criminal law may be viewed as
a means of internalizing externalities-by imposing penalties the state
seeks to force the individual to bear the true costs of his conduct; as a
result, behavior disadvantageous to others is discouraged. Reduced
criminality may thus offer gain to all.
V
THE MACROECONOMIC CONSTRAINT
That E is to be maximized does not, of course, imply that the
variables on which it depends should be assigned extreme values. Con-
servative estimates place the direct cost of crime in the United States
during 1965 at almost fifteen billion dollars; in the same period public
and private expenditures for crime control exceeded six billion dol-
lars.21 Even the least sophisticated among us recognizes that illicit activ-
ity can be reduced through commitment of additional resources. Dem-
onstrating his intuitive grasp of the obvious, Mayor Daley himself has
proclaimed: "If you have sufficient policemen, and people know that
police are patrolling the streets, you will prevent much of your crime."22
In practice, outlays for crime control seem determined primarily
by interaction between public reluctance to increase the level of tax-
20 CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY INTERIM Co rI. ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, PROG-
RfSS REPORT: DErERRENT EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 25 (1968). See generally Andenaes,
The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1966).
21 PRESIDENT'S CoiMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, CRIME
AND ITS ImPAcr-AN ASSESSMENT 44 (1967).
22 QUOTATIONS FROM MAYOR DALEY 23 (P. Yessne ed. 1969).
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ation and pressure for expansion generated from within the law en-
forcement industry. The police, abetted by their suppliers, 3 are
inclined to exaggerate the dangers of lawlessness in order to obtain
increased appropriations and greater freedom of action. 24 Simultane-
ously, of course, their symbiotic relationship with the criminal gives
them a strong interest in his survival:
[O]ne state law-enforcement officer summed up the situation this
way: "I've got a mortgage to pay off, so I've stopped fighting.
Look, I'm a good guy. I'm for the good guys. I want to see the
bad guys put in jail, like everyone else does. We don't want to
rock the boat. There are too many guys in it. We'd all go down
together. I guess you could say we're all part of the same establish-
ment, the criminals and law enforcement." 25
Maximization of social benefit entails reconciliation of outlays for
law enforcement with competing allocational claims. Ideally, marginal
investment in any aspect of any enterprise should yield a gain in utility
precisely equal to the gain available through alternative investments
and to the cost of the investment itself. If other investments are more
or less profitable at the margin, diversion of funds to or from these op-
portunities is indicated; if the cost of incremental inputs exceeds or
falls below the benefit derived, equalizing adjustment of total expen-
diture will prove advantageous. Rottenberg notes:
The gain from crimes prevented is the value of harm forestalled.
If this could be done at zero cost, social welfare would be maxi-
mized by preventing all crime. Since crime prevention consumes
resources that have alternative uses, however, the scale of the law
enforcement industry should be pushed only to the margin where
harm forestalled is equal in value to the resources employed in its
achievement. The empirical magnitudes of costs and gains are likely
to be such that some positive quantity of crime is optimal.26
In the model the opportunity cost of crime control is reflected in
the level of u, a component of each of the four possible outcomes. Com-
mitment of additional resources to the law enforcement sector implies
23 See Price, Criminal Law and Technology: Some Comments, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV.
120, 129 (1968).
24 See, e.g., N. PosKY, Husmms, BEATS, Am OThERS 174 n.25 (1967); Graham g:
Gurr, Perspectives on Crime in the United States, in VIoLENCE IN AMEICA: HisroiucAL AND
COMPARATIVE PER P EcrVS 355, 856-57 (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969); Currie, Crimes
Without Criminals: Witchcraft and Its Control in Renaissance Europe, 3 Lw & Soc'y
REv. 7 (1968).
25 Leonard, Politics, EsQUIRE, April 1969, at 84.
26 Rottenberg, in Round Table on Allocation of Resources in Law Enforcement, 59
Am. EcON. REv. (PAPERS &c PRoC.) 504, 508 (1969).
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their unavailability for other uses, and a consequent reduction in u
which may more than offset gains in u resulting from lessened crim-
inality. Higher levels of z require further funding, detrimental changes
in y, or more general circumscription of the personal liberties that
are an important element of utility schedules. Increases in w are also
usually purchased: the cost of punishment is in part a function of the
length of sentences, and associated safeguards may make execution more
expensive than imprisonment for life.27
Substitution of monetary sanctions would reduce financial burdens
but sacrifice equity to efficiency. Given a diverse population, punish-
ment of all offenders by fines exactly balancing the external disecon-
omies of their behavior would yield an equilibrium paralleling that
achieved under perfect competition. Since the sanction results in a
transfer of utility rather than a loss of utility, penalized conduct would
increase community welfare so long as profit to the offending individual
exceeded his monetary sacrifice. The objection to such a system, also
applicable to its economic analogue, is that under it benefits are allo-
cated without regard to need. Burton noted an example of its inade-
quacies in British India:
He seems to have been the first to point out to Sir Charles-who
was most reluctant to believe it-that though he had signed the
death warrants of several rich convicted murderers, the actual man
hanged was usually a poverty-stricken substitute hired in his stead.
Burton interviewed one pauper "badal" who had agreed to be
executed for a murder he had not committed and asked him why.
"Saini" came the answer. "I have been a pauper all my life.
My belly is empty. My wife and children are half starved. This is
fate, but it is beyond my patience. I get two hundred and fifty
rupees. With fifty I will buy rich food and fill myself before going
out of the world. The rest I will leave to my family. What better
can I do, Sain?" 28
While condemnation of conduct as criminal usually supposes a
determination by the community that its utility is negative, such judg-
ments are hardly infallible: the Emperor Justinian, for example, for-
bade homosexual practices to prevent earthquakes.29 Packer, in partic-
ular, has asserted that the reach of the criminal law exceeds its grasp.30
Surely efforts to suppress the use of marijuana, arguably motivated by
a puritan dread of unearned pleasure, deserve only low priority. The
27 Comment, The Death Penalty Cases, 56 CALF. L. REv. 1270, 1311-13 (1968).
28 F. BRODIE, THE DEvi. DRivEs: A LIFE OF SIR RicHAD BURTON 63-64 (1967).
29 G. VmAL, REFLECTONS UPON A SINKING SHiW 103 (1969).
30 H. PACKER, supra note 12, at 258-59, 364-66.
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more difficult question is whether resources diverted from control of
marginally criminal activity should be reassigned within the law en-
forcement sector or applied to extrinsic goals.
The model itself supplies rules governing allocative efficiency with
respect to crime control. The difficulty with allowing total outlays for
law enforcement to be determined indirectly as a consequence of indi-
vidual optimization of w, y, and z, the obvious instruments of state
policy, is that expenditure patterns which fix the marginal utility of
investment in other sectors are themselves distorted. Senator Russell,
for instance, has supported appropriations for weaponry by appeal to
perhaps the least convincing of objectives: "If we have to start over
again with another Adam and Eve, then I want them to be Americans
and not Russians-and I want them on this continent and not in Eu-
rope."'3 Funds spent in Southeast Asia have yielded a negative return.
Scrutiny of such seeming misspecifications of the values of the commu-
nity is impossible within the framework of the model; the only recourse
is to posit an improbable rationality.
CONCLUSION
Three functions summarize the relationships among the variables
of the game of section I:
(6) x = F (v, w, z)
(7) U = 1 (V, W, X, Y, Z)
(8) E = Fs (u, v, w, x, y, z)
Maximization of E requires that the rates of change of E with respect to
w, y, and z equal zero; if any is either positive or negative, further
adjustment will yield gain. Thus, given appropriate second derivatives:
OE OF3  OF3  ax OF3  Ou(9) aw aw ax Ow - au aw
(10) OE _OF 3  OF3  ou
ay ay au ay
OE _OF 3  OF3  Ox OF3  Ou
Oz Oz Ox az Ou Oz
31 N.Y. Times, Nov. 24, 1968, § 4, at 4E, cols. 1-2. Stone comments: "But what if the
unimaginable, the ultimate horror occurred and the American 'Adam' turned out to be
a Negro?" I.F. STONE'S WEEKLY, Dec. 2, 1968, at 3. See Tim NEw YoRKER, Aug. 1, 1970,
at 24.
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Here, w and z are shown to affect E not only directly but in addition
through their impact on x and u, to which E is also functionally related.
Similarly, E responds to alterations in y both because of the direct rela-
tionship between these variables and as a consequence of the depen-
dence of u on y. Isolation of the effects of changes in u caused directly
and indirectly by changes in w and z is possible through expansion of
terms from equations (9) and (11):
OF8 au OF3  OF2  OF3  OF2  Ox(12) Ou ow OF2  Ow OF2  ax aw
S OF Ou = Fs F2 + OF OF2  Ox
Ou Oz OF2  Oz OF2  ax Oz
The response of u is thus due in part to the impact of w and z on x.
Differentiation of equation (3) with respect to u, w, x, y, and z
permits substitution of more precise terms:
OF3
(14) Ws-- 1au
aw
aFx
(17) F3
ay
OF3
(18) = -wx
The change in x as w and z are altered may be obtained by differen-
tiation of equation (5).
The probability of punishment regardless of culpability may be
lowered without lessening the effectiveness of law enforcement efforts
if additional resources are devoted to crime control. Thus, choice of
an optimal level of the variable y without regard to the relationship
between y and z entails striking a balance between reduction of the
number of nonoffenders mistakenly deprived of utility and increase in
u made possible by diversion of funds from efforts to discriminate
between the guilty and the innocent. These effects are respectively
summarized in the medial terms of equation (10):
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OF8
ay
OF8  Ou
au 
ay
The state may curtail illicit conduct by making the sanctions it
imposes more severe or by augmenting the increase in the likelihood
of punishment resulting from criminal behavior. As equations (9), (11),
(12), and (13) indicate, benefit from such changes is reflected primarily
if not exclusively in reduced injury from criminal activity. Higher
levels of w and z indirectly affect u and ultimately E by lowering x:
OFs OF2  Ox
OF2  ax Ow
OFs OF2  Ox
OF2  Ox Oz
Concomitant loss is predominantly a consequence of two types of
effects. First, higher levels of w and z entail greater disutility of punish-
ment to those experiencing it and punishment of a greater proportion
of offenders:
OF8
Ow
OF8
Oz
Second, the economic and noneconomic burdens of law enforcement
seem likely to grow as w and z increase. Although the cost of punish-
ment need not vary directly with its severity, it would appear in prac-
tice to do so:
OF OF2-..<0
OF2  Ow
Moreover, if changes in z are achieved by reallocating resources while
holding y constant, one may write:
OF8  OF2- <0
OF2  Oz
If y is also permitted to vary, the result may be expressed by inclusion
of an additional term in equation (11):
1CRIMINAL PROCESS
aFs ay__ < 0
ay Oz
As shown in equation (16), the change in Fs as x changes is equal
to v - wz. Since v may or may not exceed wz, the direct impact in equa-
tions (9), (11), (12), and (13) of changes in the proportions of individuals
selecting more or less profitable courses of action is indeterminate
without additional assumptions:
OF3  Ox
Ox -w->
OF3  Ox
Ox Oz
Or:
OF3  Oxo-V- ax -g-< 0
ax aw
OFs Ox
Ox .z - o
Optimization requires both accurate estimation of community
values and skillful manipulation of legal controls.
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